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This entry is part of a three-part 
series on educational epistemologies. 
Some (perhaps many) readers will be 
unfamiliar with major philosophers and 
theoretical frameworks that speak to these 
issues. The primary aim of this project, 
however, is situate educational theorizing 
and philosophizing within the domain of 
contemporary metaphysics and 
epistemology. Specifically, it aims to 
provide a categorical framework in which 
to understand the essential (anti) 
metaphysical presuppositions and 
attending epistemological commitments 
of some the more prominent educational 
paradigms. A secondary goal of this 
article is to introduce new concepts to 
educational scholars, with the hope that 
doing so will add a new layer of 
understanding the to work of education 
scholarship. 
 
Theories and philosophies in 
education can be classified in terms of 
how they understand the nature of reality 
(metaphysics). This turns out to be quite 
significant for teachers, as well as the 
work of the educational theorist and/or  
researcher. For example, if I (an 
educational theorist) deny that the 
external world exists in some objective 
independent state as a constructivist 
might, it follows that my knowledge-
claims about this or that educational 
phenomenon will be constrained by this 
presupposition. It will also have 
important implications—as the so-called 
paradigm wars in educational research 
demonstrate—for the sort of educational 
research I carry out. Thus, reckoning with 
one’s metaphysical assumptions plays an 
important part in the consumption and 
production of research (e.g., new 
knowledge). 
 
With this in mind, I explore the 
first of these metaphysical starting points: 
anti-realism. I begin by defining anti-
realism in terms of two basic premises: 
(1) a denial that world exists 
independently and objectively outside 
human intellection, and (2) the intuition 
that our mental activity organizes and 
provides meaning to our experiences. I 
then trace out the epistemological claims 
of two particularly influential anti-realist 
frameworks in education: constructivism 
and postmodernism.  
Abstract 
 Constructivism and postmodernism endorse and anti-realist metaphysics. Once we 
abandon the fruitless search for objective reality, so the argument goes, we can devote ourselves to 
making our beliefs more efficacious than they were before. We can do this because we have given up 
truth-as-correspondence, and have embraced the claim that what makes a belief right is just that 
experience has taught us that it works. In short, because our claims to truth (and thus knowledge) 
refer to utter contingent accounts of reality, it follows that they are only contextually true. As such, 
any claim to an invariant foundation (an objectively knowable external world, for example) for 
knowledge is met with skepticism. Instead, knowledge ought to be concerned with the local and 









The term “anti-realist” is far-
reaching. One can be an anti-realist about 
some or all of the following: physical 
entities, morals, the past, the future, other 
minds, universals, and so on. Alvin 
Plantinga (1982) provides the follow 
concise description of anti-realism: 
 
The core of…anti-realism is the 
idea that objects in the world 
owe their fundamental 
structure—and, if they couldn’t 
exist without displaying that 
structure, their existence—to our 
creative activity. The world as it 
is in itself, apart from this 
structuring activity, doesn’t 
display any of these features. 
The idea is that if there were no 
persons (or if there were some 
and they didn’t structure the 
world in the way in which we do 
in fact structure it) then there 
would be no objects in space or 
time, none displaying object 
property structure, no number of 
things of any sort, and the like 
(p. 50). 
 
Plantinga makes two relevant 
observations here: (1) the mind is 
responsible for structuring and ordering 
experience, and (2) without this mental 
activity these objects would have no 
fundamental ordering or structure 
whatsoever. Each position outlined below 
is (according to its own logic) anti-realist; 
each is dubious of “objective” knowledge 
claims about the actual state-of-affairs 




Perhaps the most influential 
theory of learning in education these days 
is constructivism. Although 
constructivism takes many forms—some 
quite radical, others relatively 
moderate—it generally denies the 
traditional conception of knowledge as 
justified true belief. Instead, most 
constructivists endorse an explicitly anti-
realist thesis that (1) knowledge is 
constructed by an individual or society, 
because (2) there is no shared reality to 
which our beliefs about the world 
correspond. Put differently, individuals 
interpret and give meaning to the world 
around them. A socially constructed 
reality emerges when persons share their 
realities with one another. However, both 
(1) and (2) are subject to multiple 
interpretations.  
 
Constructivism stresses the 
subjective nature of experience and the 
vital contribution of the learner and 
teacher to the process of acquiring new 
knowledge (or making meaning). 
Likewise, the products of constructivist 
research (e.g., ethnographic research, 
self-studies, grounded research) are 
recognized and embraced as systematic 
subjective representations of reality. A 
representation, of course, is not distinct 
picture of the world as it is; rather, it is 
filtered interpretation of how the world 
manifests itself. As such, findings in a 
qualitative study might be loosely defined 
as “knowledge” insofar as they make 
sense of our shared social experiences. 
Neither students nor researchers, 
however, are gaining new knowledge of 
the world “out there.”  
 
In this way, constructivism clearly 
parts ways with traditional Anglo/analytic 
accounts of knowledge as justified true 
belief. The crux of the issue lies most 
centrally in the particular account of truth 
posited by constructivists. Metaphysical 




correspondence relationship between a 
mind and world: through our perceptual 
faculties we perceive the world around us 
and can then make certain justified claims 
about it. A true belief, on this account, is 
one in which a proposition (a statement of 
fact) matches reality. Anti-realists would 
counter that we have little reason to 
believe our minds have access to such a 
reality. It follows that truth claims gain 
no force by appealing to the external 
world as it really is. The upshot is that 
constructivists must reject the traditional 
articulation of knowledge as justified true 
belief. 
 
Several important figures in the 
history of education have endorsed or 
been associated a variety of moderate 
forms of constructivism, e.g., Jean Piaget 
(1954), Jerome Bruner (1973), and Lev 
Vygotsky (1978). Names most educators 
will certainly recognize. Piaget, for 
example, argued that knowledge is 
internalized by way of assimilation and 
accommodation (cognitive 
constructivism). Assimilation refers to the 
process whereby new experiences are 
integrated into our existing knowledge 
framework. Suppose I read a novel by 
Tolstoy. As I work through the text, I 
encounter new ideas and interesting 
passages. These are assimilated into my 
pre-existing network of knowledge. My 
mind then takes a further step to 
accommodate this new knowledge. Thus, 
accommodation is a re-framing of my 
mental representations of the external 
world. It follows that one’s mind is 
always in the process of changing. Here 
we see the influence of John Dewey’s 
pragmatic philosophy of education on 
constructivist (and postmodern) theories 
of knowledge construction.  
 
In Democracy and Education, 
Dewey (1922) writes, “In schools, those 
under instruction are too customarily 
looked upon as acquiring knowledge as 
theoretical spectators, minds which 
appropriate knowledge by direct energy of 
intellect. The very word pupil has almost 
come to mean one who is engaged not in 
having fruitful experiences but in 
absorbing knowledge directly. Something 
which is called mind or consciousness is 
severed from the physical organs of 
activity” (p. 164). Dewey, like 
constructivists, views the acquisition of 
knowledge as a constructive and ongoing 
process. One does not simply learn, but 




 Postmodernism, often used 
interchangeably with poststructuralism 
and methodologically tied to 
deconstructionism, is another anti-realist 
theory that has garnered considerable 
attention in education over the past few 
decades. Two often cited contemporary 
curriculum theorists—Patrick Slattery 
(2006) and William Doll (1993)—have 
endorsed poststructural approaches as 
modes of inquiry that open new 
possibilities for understanding the 
present-day educational landscape. Doll, 
for example, predicts that a “new sense of 
educational order will emerge, as will 
new relations between teachers and 
students, culminating in a new concept of 
curriculum” (p. 3). Doll’s prediction, 
made in 1993, may well have come to 
fruition within the context of curriculum 
scholarship. New curricular models and 
frameworks inspired by postmodern 
thought continue to find purchase in 
educational thinking.   
 




Offering a concise definition of 
postmodernism, however, tends to be 
difficult. According to Usher and 
Edwards (1994), “There is a sense, 
anyhow, in which it is impossible to fully 
define the postmodern since the very 
attempt to do so confers upon it a status 
and identity which it must necessarily 
oppose.” Rather, the terms postmodern, 
postmodernism, and postmodernity are 
“loose umbrella term[s] under whose 
broad cover can be encompassed at one 
and the same time a condition, a set of 
practices, a cultural discourse, an attitude 
and a mode of analysis” (p. 7). In short, 
to systematize postmodernism is to miss 
the point of postmodernism. Thus, the 
following analysis aims only at 
approximation—fully aware that 
codification reifies exactly that which 
postmodernity repudiates. Nevertheless, 
if, as its advocates maintain, 
postmodernism is a new way of thinking 
about education, what does it have to say 
about knowledge? 
 
There are, of course, numerous 
postmodern perspectives in educational 
theory. Patti Lather (1992) argues for 
deconstruction when approaching 
educational issues and research. 
According to Lather, the goal of 
deconstruction “is to keep things in 
process, to disrupt, to keep the system in 
play, to set up procedures to continuously 
demystify the realities we create, to fight 
the tendency for our categories to 
congeal” (p. 96). Knowledge is thus 
unmoored from any objective (static or 
fixed) external state of affairs—any 
singular account of reality. Many, if not 
all, postmodernists would agree with 
Lather’s insistence that we deconstruct 
the binaries and categories that permeate 
education. Nevertheless, some have 
called for “constructive” elements in 
postmodernism. Patrick Slattery describes 
his own constructive approach that “seeks 
to integrate the best features of 
premodern rural, agrarian societies (such 
as spirituality, cosmology, and 
family/tribal community values) in order 
to construct a more balanced and 
ecologically sustainable global 
community” (p. 28). And still others 
address educational issues through a 
postmodern reading of scientific 
development (Tobin, 1993). Likewise, 
others have focused their attentions on 
ecological issues. Chet bowers (1993), for 
example, works to create a postmodern 
theory of ecological justice rooted in a 
sense of generational and biotic 
connectedness. I sum, there are 
innumerable positions available to the 
postmodern theorist. What binds many of 
them together is a strong sense of justice: 
ecological justice, economic justice, and 
social justice.  
 
At root postmodernism is deeply 
suspicious of so-called modernist meta or 
grand narratives about knowing and 
knowledge. It is argued that these 
narratives describe or frame the world in 
a fixed language that simply cannot 
represent the shifting nature of reality. 
Instead, postmodern thought starts with 
the assumption that the structures, 
systems, and relationships that underpin 
modernist accounts of reality are wholly 
contingent and fluid. Richard Rorty 
(1999), for example, presents a 
postmodern theory of knowledge that 
denies that we have direct access to 
reality—that is, the way things are 
independent of the mind. Rather, he 
argues that knowledge (and epistemology) 
ought to be replaced with “hope” in better 
ways of believing. He warns, "One should 
stop worrying about whether what one 




worrying about whether one has been 
imaginative enough to think up interesting 
alternatives to one's present beliefs" (p. 
34).  
 
Discussion: The Upshot 
 
The preceding accounts of 
constructivism and postmodernism are 
significant for teachers and educational 
researchers on several fronts. To begin 
with, I would argue that purveyors of 
knowledge (teachers) ought to have a 
strong grasp of what it is they are up to. 
When a teacher gives a lecture on the 
process of photosynthesis, for example, is 
she sharing something true and 
incontrovertible about the world as it is, or 
should she understand her lectures as 
representing something contingent and 
socially constructed? Constructivist 
thinkers are quite right to emphasize the 
importance of meaning making and 
personal learning schemes, especially if 
organizing the content of experience is so 
deeply embedded in learners’ mental 
activity.  
 
Suppose, however, an educator has 
concluded that constructivist and/or 
postmodern epistemology has missed the 
mark. Given constructivism’s expressed 
relativism and postmodernism’s 
political/ideological leanings, it is not 
difficult to image some students rejecting 
their essential epistemological claims in 
favor of theories that endorse an 
objectively knowable world 
(epistemological realism). What practical 
implications would this have on her 
instructional practices? Do the best 
practices of constructivism conflict with 
realism?  Such questions ought to occupy 
a central place in the academic training of 
teachers in teacher education programs.  
 
Likewise, creators of new 
knowledge (researchers) would do well to 
consider the epistemological foundations 
of constructivism and postmodernism. 
Having discussed these issues with my 
university colleagues, I have observed that 
relatively few professors of education have 
given much attention to the 
epistemological and metaphysical 
implications of anti-realist theories. The 
reason is relatively simple. Few faculty 
members have extensive background in 
philosophy, which explains the relative 
lack of theoretical sophistication when 
dealing with epistemological claims. One 
remedy I strongly advocate is the inclusion 
of two required doctoral-level courses in 
philosophy of education and educational 
epistemology. The former would provide a 
general overview of the major 
philosophical movements that have 
influenced the trajectory of contemporary 
schooling, while the latter provide a space 
for doctoral students to work through their 
personal epistemological worldview. The 
upshot is that greater understanding of 
these issues would not only improve future 
academicians’ understanding, but would 
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